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STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.
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HAROLD EARL BUSHAM,
Defendant / Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE SHOULD HAVE BARRED
BUSHMAN'S CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AFTER HE HAD BEEN
FINED BY THE STIPULATION AND CONSENT ORDER
The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the "imposition of multiple criminal

punishments for the same offense[.]" Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct.
488, 493, 139 L.Ed2d 450 (1997). The inquiry into whether or not a penalty is civil or
criminal has two levels. "First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other." United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248, 100
S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (internal citations omitted). "Second, where
Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that

intention." Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (reaffirmed in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,
99)). Here, Bushman asserts that the Utah Legislature did not intend to make the fines
authorized by Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-20 a civil sanction and thus the fines imposed
upon Bushman constitute criminal punishment preceding the criminal charges underlying
this case. Bushman also asserts that if this Courtfindsthrough implication that the
legislature intended the fines to be a civil sanction that the fines serve no remedial or civil
purpose and are therefore punitive and criminal in purpose and effect.
A. The legislature did not explicitly or implicitly express an intent to make the
fines imposed under § 61-1-20 a civil penalty.
The legislature was not explicit in its intent to make the punishment civil. Nothing
on the face of the statute expresses the legislature's intent to make the fines authorized in
Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-20 a civil sanction as opposed to punitive criminal
punishment. In response to this lack of express intent the State has argued that such
intent may be implied from the nature of the authorization to impose thefine.See
Appellee's Brief at 16 ("The legislature's authorization of administratively imposed
sanctions demonstrates that those sanctions are civil in nature"). The State cites Hudson
in support of the proposition that "[t]hat such authority was conferred upon
administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that [the Utah legislature] intended to
provide for a civil sanction." Appellee's Brief at 16 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 105).
However, Bushman asserts that the State has used Hudson loosely and that case should
be distinguished from the facts of this case.
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A clear distinction can be drawn from the implicit intent found by the United States
Supreme Court in Hudson and the way the State argues this Court should find implicit
intent to make the money penalties civil in this case. In Hudson the statues that provided
for the "imposition of monetary penalties for violations of [banking regulations],
expressly provide that such penalties are 'civil.'" Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 103. Because the
monetary sanctions were explicitly intended to be civil the Court needed only determine
whether the monetary penalties were "so punitive in form and effect as to render them
criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary." Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (citing
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d 549
(1996)). No such explicit intention is present in this case so this Court is obliged to first
determine whether the monetary sanctions imposed on Bushman were first intended to be
civil in nature before examining whether or not a civil sanction is rendered criminal by its
form and effect.
The language quoted by the State, relating to the legislature's implied intentions
based on the fact that it authorized an administrative agency to impose sanctions, is
misplaced. See Appellee's Brief at 16 {citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103). The State uses
the language to insinuate that an implied intention to make fines a civil sanction,
however, in Hudson, the Court found an implied intention only in the case of the
administrative agency's power of debarment in the banking industry and not the
monetary fines. Debarment is an administrative function, while monetary fines are
unrelated to the administrative agency's inherent power over the market. Bushman
asserts that, in Hudson, had Congress not been explicit with regard to its intent for the
3

monetary penalties to be civil the fact that an administrative agency was authorized to
impose them would not be sufficient to deem it impliedly civil. Otherwise the it seems
any power or sanction given an agency would be impliedly civil rendering the first prong
useless.
An example of implied intent may be found in Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244,
1249 (10th Cir. 2000), where the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found a law requiring
registration of sex offenders to be established as a civil remedy and not a criminal
punishment "from the simple fact that the legislature placed the statute in the civil code
as opposed to the criminal code." The Court of Appeals found that the intent of the
legislature was demonstrated both by the placement in the civil code and the fact that the
statute promoted a remedial measure to an administrative problem (investigating and
apprehending offenders in sex-related crimes). However, this case is not so simple. Here
the fact that the monetary fines found in § 61-1-20 are located in the 'civil code' as
opposed to the 'criminal code' (presumably within § 76) is not persuasive due to the
obvious fact that the criminal charges brought against Bushman in this case were based
on a crime and punishment found outside the criminal code in § 61-1-21. The placement
of the monetary fine in § 61-1-20 outside the criminal code does not demonstrates an
intent to make it civil any more than the placement of § 61-1-21 outside the criminal code
demonstrates an intent to make the criminal penalties a civil remedy.
As for remedial effect, Bushman reasserts that unlike Femedeer, the fines arising
from § 61-1-20 have no remedial purpose other that to punish those involved in the
conduct the legislature sought to prohibit. The fines do not represent money owed by an
4

offender to reimburse the State for damages to State property or to pay for funds
expended by the State in enforcing § 61-1-1. The imposition of the fine is not designed
to allow the agency to investigate or apprehend offenders of securities fraud. The fines
are not motivated by concerns of administrative convenience. See Femedeer, 227 F.3d
1244, 1249. The fines found in § 61-1-20 are designed to punish an offender and to deter
other would-be offenders. These purposes are not remedial and thus, unlike Femedeer,
do not demonstrate an implied intention to make the sanction civil.
B. Even if this Court finds an implicit legislative intent that fines under § 61-1-20
be considered civil the fines imposed on Bushman should be held to be a
criminal punishment according to the Kennedy factors.
"Even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a
civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to transform] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty." Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (internal quotations omitted).
Bushman asserts that if the legislature's intention to make the fines a civil penalty is
implied the actual purpose and effect of the fine is a punitive and criminal punishment for
Double Jeopardy purposes.
The United States Supreme Court laid out seven key factors in determining whether
a legislatively created sanction is civil or criminal in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1962). The Court suggested that
"[ajbsent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute,
these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face." Kennedy, 372 U.S.
144,169. A reviewing court should ask "[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative
5

disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which
it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned[.]" Id. at 168-69.
The State has alleged that the fines imposed on Bushman did not "'involve an
affirmative disability or restraint' - 'certainly nothing approaching the infamous
punishment of imprisonment."5 Appellee's Brief at 13 (quoting Hudson at 104) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). In Hudson, the fine is not considered an affirmative
disability or restraint but the fine was imposed only "[a]fter taking into account the size
of the financial resources and the good faith of [petitioners], the gravity of the
violations[.]" Id, at 97. Certainly a monetary fine may be considered as debilitative as
imprisonment and therefore criminal depending on the circumstances. The Court in
Hudson found, under the circumstances, the fines imposed were not an affirmative
disability or restraint. Here, Bushman urges this Court to find, under the circumstances,
the fines imposed upon him by the Division of Securities were, due to the circumstances,
akin to criminal sanctions.
In its brief the State has argued that "neither money penalties nor debarment has
historically been viewed as a punishment." Appellee's Brief at 13 (quoting Hudson at
104). However the statement in Hudson deals with monetary penalties that have a
remedial character based on the government's expenses resulting from the offender's
6

conduct. See Hudson at 97 (defendant issued illegal loans that contributed to the failure
of federally insured banks); see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401, 58 S.Ct.
630, 634, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938) (fines levied upon fraudulent taxpayer found civil because
it acted as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government
for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the fraud). When fines
are imposed with a remedial purpose they have not been traditionally seen as punishment,
however, when fines are focused on retribution for the commission of conduct, for
example a crime, then a fine is a commonly accepted form of punishment. Bushman
argues that in this case the fine imposed upon him at the time of the Consent Order was
not remedial but was merely a punishment for his conduct relevant to §61-1-1.
The third factor to consider is whether the penalty comes into play only on a
finding of scienter. Section 61-1-1 requires that the unlawful act of fraud requires either
an intent to defraud, mislead, or deceive. Section 61-1-20 then simply authorizes the
director to penalize anyone who has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in an act
or practice constituting a violation of this chapter, including § 61-1-1. Therefore the
monetary fines authorized in § 61-1-20 come into play only upon afindingof scienter.
Just as with traditional crimes, securities fraud as defined by title 61, is a crime that
requires a mens rea element. In fact, Bushman asserts that there is no significant
difference between the scienter requirements of §§ 61-1-20 and 61-1-21.
The next factor is whether the penalty's operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment - retribution and deterrence. Not only do the fines authorized by § 61-1-20
promote retribution and deterrence, but Bushman asserts that these are the only two
7

purposes served by the fines. As mentioned above, there are no corresponding
government costs to repay; the fines are in addition to restitution so they do not serve to
make injured parties whole. There is no remedial purpose to the fines authorized in § 611-20. The State claims that thefineswere remedial because they encouraged Bushman to
pay restitution in a timely manner, however only the reduction in the fines and not the
fines themselves. The fact that the fines may be reduced upon Bushman's timely
repayment of his debts does not give the fines as a whole a remedial purpose. The
purpose of the reduction is arguably remedial but the fines were punishment for a
violation of §61-1-1. Because the fines operate to promote retribution and deterrence
they are more like a traditional criminal punishment than a civil penalty.
The next factor is whether the behavior to which the fine applies is already a crime.
The Court in Kennedy cites Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562, 42 S.Ct. 549, 551, 66
L.Ed. 1061 (1922), as an example of this factor. In Lipke the Court found that where
"evidence of crime... is essential to assessment [of the questionable tax]... [i]t lacks all
the ordinary characteristics of a tax, whose primary function is to provide for the support
of the government [whereas the tax in question] clearly involves the idea of punishment
for infraction of the law-the definite function of a penalty." Lipke, 259 U.S. 557, 562. See
also United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295, 56 S.Ct. 223, 227, 80 L.Ed 233
(1935) ("The condition of the imposition is the commission of a crime. This, together
with the amount of the tax, is again significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than
the gathering of revenue."). Analogously, the fines in § 61-1-20 require the same
evidence as do the felonies found in § 61-1-21. The elements of the crimes in § 61-1-21
8

and the conduct required for the fines in § 61-1-20 are the same. According to this factor
the fine is not a civil penalty at all but a criminal punishment.
The final factor is whether an alternative purpose to which the penalty may
rationally be connected is assignable for it and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned. The Court in Kennedy again cites Lipke as an example
in this factor. In Lipke the monetary punishment was called a tax "in an act primarily
designed to define and suppress crime[.]"The Court found that this alleged alternative
purpose could not overcome the punitive nature of the imposition. See also United States
v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572, 51 S.Ct. 278, 280, 75 L.Ed. 551 (1931) ("if an exaction
be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted to a tax by the simple expedient of calling it
such... [it is] a penalty involving the idea of punishment for infraction of the law"). Here
there is no explicit alternative purpose to which the fine may be connected. As the State
put it the statutes create "sanctions for securities violations and also define[] criminal
offenses based on such violations." Appellee's Brief at 15. The alternative purpose
argued by the State, "encouraging Defendant's repaying of his victims in a timely
manner[,]" is only a secondary or If the trial court had ordered that a fine will arise if
Bushman failed to repay his debts within a certain time then the fine would arguably be
remedial, however the imposition of the fine was connected with the violation of the
securities law as punishment for that conduct and the reduction of the fine after the fact
was merely incidentally related to the purpose of aiding the victim's recovery.

9

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the fine imposed upon Bushman constituted a criminal punishment for the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the trial court should have dismissed the
criminal charges underlying this appeal. Bushman therefore requests this Court to
reverse his conviction and sentence based on his conditional plea and remand the case to
the District Court where his motion to dismiss should be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of December, 2009.

Margaret rtlindsay
Douglas J. Thompson
Counsel for Appellant
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